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RECONSTRUCTING AMERICA'S SOCIAL CONTRACT IN
EMPLOYMENT: THE ROLE OF POLICY, INSTITUTIONS,
AND PRACTICES
THOMAS A. KOCHAN*
The primary challenge facing labor and employment policies in
the next decade is to reconstruct the social contract between the
American workforce and employers in ways that address the needs
and realities of a modern economy and society. To do so, the country
will need to modernize the labor and employment policies carried
over from the New Deal era and foster innovations in labor unions,
labor market institutions, corporations, and in their relationships.
Unfortunately, the political will to take on this task is absent at
the national level of policy-making and political discourse. Instead,
the failed efforts at incremental reforms in labor policy have
characterized the past two decades, starting with the 1977 labor law
reform debate and more recently illustrated by the failure of the
Dunlop Commission to break the political impasse over labor and
employment policy.' The result is that analysis and debates over
these issues have been marginalized as "special interest politics."
How then should we proceed? Perhaps we should return to our
roots and take a lesson from the work of John R. Commons and his
associates, whose work in the early years of this century eventually
laid the intellectual foundation for the New Deal labor and
employment policies. I believe we are in an environment similar to
the one these pioneers of labor policy faced, a point I will return to at
the end of this essay. In the intervening sections, I will attempt to
outline the changes in national policies and institutions that I believe
* Thomas A. Kochan is the George M. Bunker Professor of Management at the MIT
Sloan School of Management and Co-Director of MIT's Institute for Work and Employment
Research. He is currently president of the Industrial Relations Research Association and past
president of the International Industrial Relations Research Association. He received his Ph.D.
in Industrial Relations from the University of Wisconsin. Support for this work was provided by
the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Ford
Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. The views expressed are solely those of the
author.
1. See generally COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, FACT FINDING REPORT (May, 1994).
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are needed to support workers and employers in their efforts to re-
negotiate a social contract suitable for the modern economy and
workforce.
I. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM "SOCIAL CONTRACT"
The term social contract is often used but seldom defined. I use
it to characterize the mutual expectations and obligations that
employees, employers, and society at large has for work and
employment relationships. These expectations and obligations are
derived from a constellation of factors, including one's career
aspirations, occupational norms, education and professional training,
macro economic trends and performance, and societal values
regarding democracy, freedom of expression and association, equity
and fairness, etc. The social contract that is under duress today grew
up over the decades following World War II in which an expanding
economy produced a set of rising expectations and aspirations in
society that carried over to relations at the workplace. While a
caricature, the features of that social contract generally included the
expectation that wages and earnings would rise in tandem with
increasing productivity and prosperity of employers and economy.
Hard work and good performance, and loyalty would be rewarded
with security, fair treatment, dignity, and status. With increased
tenure at a firm came certain "property rights" to a job. That is, job
and income security would accumulate over time with tenure, thereby
producing an upward sloping age-earning profile, rising standards of
living, and savings for retirement.
At the macro level, the economy has performed relatively well in
generating new jobs, reducing unemployment, controlling inflation,
and improving the competitiveness of American firms in global
markets. Compared to historical standards, however, the economy
has performed relatively poorly when measured against
improvements in real earnings, income inequality, employment
security, and income security for workers displaced due to economic
and organizational restructuring. Therefore, improving the quality of
jobs and employment outcomes must be a primary objective.
The United States has performed poorly on another dimension
of national welfare that does not show up in aggregate economic
statistics: it has allowed its basic labor market institutions and their
relationships to deteriorate and become more adversarial, thereby
reducing their capacity to innovate and adjust to the changing
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workforce and economy. A critical task for labor and employment
policy makers lies in fostering innovations within these institutions
and reconstructing positive relations among them. The starting point
for this effort is to update how we view employment relationships
today.
II. TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP
For more than sixty years, American labor and employment
policies have been predicated on a view of work and employment as a
long-term relationship between a large firm competing mostly in an
expanding domestic market involving one of two types of employees,
hourly wage workers or salaried managers, with a spouse at home
attending to family and personal matters. However, today's labor
force and employment practices vary considerably from this standard
picture. The distinction between management and labor or exempt
and non-exempt is increasingly blurred by the movement to
decentralize decision-making to lower organizational levels and the
growth in technical, middle and lower level managerial, and
professional occupations. The increased labor force participation of
women has not only changed the demographic make-up of the labor
force, but also challenged deeply engrained assumptions about the
relationships of work, family, and personal life. The prevalence of
part-time work and the growth of temporary, contract, and self-
employed workers, along with the increased risk of permanent job
loss, adds further variation to the nature and duration of employment
relationships.
The New Deal employment policies were enacted with a focus on
the domestic economy. The underlying objective of these policies has
been to standardize conditions at the high levels that Americans
expect and thereby "take wages and terms of employment out of
competition." However, globalization of product markets, along with
increased product market competition and ease of entry into highly
differentiated domestic markets, render efforts to take wages out of
competition through standardization difficult if not impossible. In the
absence of a policy that promotes improvements in labor force
quality, availability, and utilization, this inability to standardize wages
leads to both "a race to the bottom" i.e., a decline in wages of those
lacking the skills needed to provide firms with a competitive
advantage on the basis of product quality, technological innovation,
1999]
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and customer service, and to an increase in the premiums offered to
those who have the skills and abilities needed by firms seeking to
compete on these other grounds. Thus, the future of the overall wage
structure and income distribution in the United States will be
determined by the ability of our policies and institutions to supply a
labor force with the skills needed to compete on bases other than
wages and labor costs and to encourage American firms to compete
on this basis, rather than get mired in a fruitless "race to the bottom."
The New Deal labor policies were based on a fundamental
premise that continues to be valid and useful in an economy with
highly varied employment relationships. That is, the premise
underlying collective bargaining has always been that the parties
closest to the problems of their workplace are best positioned to
shape the terms and conditions of employment that suit their needs
and circumstances. This, I would argue, is a first principle to which
we need to return if we are to reconstruct a social contract suited to
today's economy and workforce. To implement this principle in an
effective way in today's economy; however, will require several
fundamental changes in perspectives.
First, the implicit model of the standard employment relationship
needs to be replaced with a more accurate view of the range of
employment settings observed in today's economy. The starting
premise must recognize and build on the variations found in
contemporary employment relationships. The goal should be to
encourage continuous upgrading and improvement in employment
practices and standards in ways that allow for flexibility in how the
underlying policy goals are achieved.
Second, employment policies should anticipate and support
mobility across jobs and employers. Policies designed to encourage
high and improving employment standards and practices within
individual firms and employment settings need to be integrated with
policies designed to encourage mobility so that the costs of job
changing are reduced and the costs to employers of hiring and
developing new employees are likewise lowered.
Third, the enforcement and monitoring of employment
regulations should also build on the variations in employment settings
by encouraging the development and maintenance of democratic self-
governance processes among the parties to employment relationships.
By recognizing that the parties closest to the workplace know the
most about how to adapt broad principles to fit their particular
circumstances, and by giving them the opportunities to implement
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this principle in practice, we can achieve the goals of our national
policies both more efficiently and effectively and encourage practices
and innovations that move us above the minimum standards required
by law.
Finally, the twenty-year record of failed efforts at incremental
reforms or negotiated compromises within the existing policy
framework suggest that a different approach is also needed to the
design and enactment of labor and employment policies. The
marginalization of these issues to the status of "special interest
politics" and the inability of the traditional interest groups-labor
and business-to negotiate compromise or incremental reforms in the
face of mounting problems suggest new participants need to be
brought in to the process of policy formation and debate. In short, a
broader constituency needs to be created that sees an effective and
modern labor and employment policy vital to its goals and
aspirations. Workers at all occupational levels are an important part
of this constituency and therefore we need to listen attentively to
their voices and bring them into the policy making process.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES
The foundation of a policy that supports renegotiating the social
contract in employment lies in the rules governing interactions
between employees and employers in negotiating the terms and
conditions of employment and their day-to-day administration.
Unfortunately, this aspect of American labor law is perhaps the most
outdated and ineffective of all components of employment policy.
This was one of the basic conclusions documented in the Fact Finding
Report of the Commission on'the Future of Worker Management
Relations.2 Three sets of problems were identified.
A. Failure of Labor Law
A basic tenet of the National Labor Relations Act is that
employees should be able to choose whether or not they wish to be
represented by a labor union for the purpose of collective bargaining.
This is a bedrock principle for labor policy in any democracy and
remains as valid and necessary today as it. was when first embodied in
national policy in the 1930s. Unfortunately, rather than a free choice,
the process by which employees gain access to union representation
2. See generally id.
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today often resembles a highly pitched, high-stakes battle in which
the benefits to the winners and the costs to the losers are very high.
Consider the basic facts:
1. The level of conflict, as measured by the number of unfair labor
practices that occur and the likelihood of legal challenges that
extend the time required to complete a representation election
process, has increased over the years resulting in increased
frustrations among workers and unions with these procedures.
The reality today is that only a very small number of workers and
unions trust and use the election procedures to gain recognition
(in the 1990s, on average, less than 250,000 workers voted in
certification elections per year, out of approximately sixty-five
million non-union workers eligible under the law).
2. The probability that a worker will be discharged or discriminated
against for attempting to organize a union increased over the
past twenty years. Approximately twenty-five percent of
representation election processes result in at least one worker
being illegally discharged.
3. Where unions win elections, approximately one-third fail to
achieve a first contract as the battle over initial recognition
continues into the negotiations process.
These problems could be addressed by making improvements in
the procedures and legal remedies that govern current organizing and
representation election procedures. Unnecessary delays in the
election process could be reduced by broader use of injunctions to put
workers discharged during organizing campaigns back to work
immediately. Challenges to bargaining units could be heard by the
National Labor Relations Board after the election is held and the
results tabulated. Arbitration of first contracts could be provided in
those cases where it is necessary to achieve a fair first contract.
Indeed, these are essential starting points for remedying long-
standing and clearly documented injustices in the law as it is actually
experienced by workers and employers today.
But these changes are only a starting point. Alone, they do
nothing to address the deeper structural limitations of the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). The basic structural problem can be
summarized as follows: the only way to gain union representation is
for a worker to convince a majority of his or her peers that
management cannot be trusted (or, in plain English, that the
employer is a bastard) and that collectively they should run the risk of
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losing their jobs to gain representation. If a majority cannot be
convinced to do so, or if the majority is not successful in overcoming
the delays, employer opposition, and workplace tensions that
accompany the union recognition and first contract bargaining
process, no individual gets representation even if up to forty-nine
percent want to be represented. If the workers are successful in
establishing a bargaining relationship, they can expect the employer
to resist contract improvements to the extent that competitors are not
also organized and likely to match the union negotiated gains.
The fact is that the U.S. has the most rigid and high cost system
of worker representation of all the industrialized democratic
countries. The risks and costs to workers come in the difficulty any
individual has in gaining access to representation under the law. The
costs to employers come if it does get unionized and must compete
against other non-union domestic employers or with firms from a low
wage country.
The result of this limited system and the difficulties workers
encounter in gaining access to it and using it to address their key
interests are visible in worker surveys dating back from the 1970s to
now. About one-third of the non-union workforce express an interest
in joining a union. This implies that nearly twenty-five million
workers want to be represented by a union but cannot gain access to
representation.3 These same surveys consistently find that there is a
latent demand for another form of representation not anticipated or
supported within traditional labor law. Approximately seventy to
eighty percent of the respondents to these surveys indicate an interest
in being a part of a process that consults and has significant influence
in decisionmaking, but that has the cooperation, not the opposition,
of management. The clear and consistent message is that workers
want more varied forms of participation and representation than the
type promised but not realized in the NLRA.
Given that the primary focus of collective bargaining remains
wages, benefits, and working conditions, employers have strong
incentives to resist unions, and, once organized, must compete with
non-union firms that are on average likely to experience at least (and
in some cases more) ten to twenty percent lower wage and benefit
costs. This further reinforces the adversarial tendencies of the U.S.
3. See Thomas A. Kochan, How American Workers View Labor Unions, 102 MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Apr., 1979, at 23, 23-31; See also RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, THE




labor relations system. While some of these costs to employers are
unavoidable, the trade-off between representation and employer
costs could be reduced by opening the law up to allow for alternative
types of representation in addition to exclusive representation under
collective bargaining. Some of these might involve the type of direct
employee participation that will be discussed below, however, others
could involve a variety of elected or jointly selected workplace or
enterprise councils that involve the full range of employees found at
the workplace and worker representation in corporate governance
structures, etc. One advantage of opening the law up to allow for
these alternative structures and processes is that it would encourage
the type of institutional innovation in labor organizations that will be
called for in a later section of this paper.
B. Failure of Labor Law to Promote Direct Participation4
In response to intensified competition and worker expectations
for a voice in workplace affairs, a majority of American employers
have introduced one or more types of direct employee participation.
Recent surveys find these programs equally likely to be in unionized
workplaces as in non-union workplaces.5 Employee surveys indicate
both a high level of interest in having the opportunity to participate
directly in workplace decisions affecting their job and, where present,
the majority of employees want to see these practices sustained. The
evidence to date suggests that the broader the scope of the
innovations, the bigger their effects on productivity and quality .6 Yet
the broader their scope, the more they are likely to also violate
provisions of the NLRA. Thus, another limitation of the labor law
inherited from the New Deal era is that it not only does not
encourage and support new forms of employee participation within
the workplace that hold promise for improving economic
performance and worker welfare, but also some of the law's
provisions may limit the development and diffusion of new
approaches to employee participation in workplace problem-solving,
4. See generally COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
supra note 1.
5. See generally THOMAS A. KOCHAN & PAUL OSTERMAN, THE MUTUAL GAINS
ENTERPRISE (1994); RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, supra note 3; Seymour Martin
Lipset & Noah M. Meltz, Canadian and American Attitudes Toward Work and Institutions, 1:3
PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, 1419 (1997).
6. See Casey Ichniowski et al., What Works at Work: Overview and Assessment, 35 INDUS.
REL., 299-333 (1996).
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enterprise decision-making and governance.
These limitations could, in theory, be addressed by eliminating or
modifying section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA that limits employee
participation in non-union settings. The problem with this type of
surgical excision is that it would not only leave the other problems
with the law unaddressed, but would also make it more difficult for
workers to gain access to independent representation since one of the
most effective union avoidance strategies an employer can mount is
the promise of an employee participation program. Thus, any easing
or elimination of the restrictions on employee participation need to
be accompanied by increased opportunities for individual workers to
choose the forms of participation and representation that best suit
their circumstances and needs. As will be noted below, opening up
labor policy in this comprehensive way would also help to foster the
institutional innovations needed to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of workplace regulations.
C. Increased Regulations, Declining Enforcement7
A third problem relates to the range of regulations governing
specific issues or practices in the workplace. The number of
regulations has grown, the number of claims brought before
enforcement agencies has increased, even as staffing levels and other
resources have been kept flat or declined, and the number of
members of the labor force that are either excluded de facto for lack
of resources or de jure for falling outside the definition of a "covered
employee" renders these legal protections meaningless for large
numbers of labor force participants. Thus, an overhaul is needed of
both the scope of coverage and the means used to enforce and
monitor compliance with these regulations. Recently, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and the
regulatory agencies administered within the Department of Labor all
announced initiatives designed to encourage use of alternative means
for resolving problems and increasing compliance. OSHA, for
example, has encouraged state and regional experimentation with
self-governance programs in which it reduces the use of its inspection
and penalties in workplaces that have in place comprehensive safety
and health programs that include a role for employee participation.
7. See generally COMMISSION ON THE FUTuRE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
supra note 1.
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The EEOC and the Department of Labor are experimenting with use
of voluntary mediation and arbitration to resolve claimed violations
of employees' statutory rights. But all of these efforts run the risk of
violating labor law by encouraging employee participation on
working conditions covered under the NLRA. Safety, for example, is
a mandatory subject of bargaining. Labor management committees
in non-union settings that make effective recommendations on safety
issues would likely be in violation of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.
Similar problems are likely to exist with the expanded use of
ADR techniques to resolve workplace disputes involving statutory
rights. Most experts agree8 that ADR techniques work best when
they are part of a comprehensive system of workplace justice that
includes, among other things, internal grievance and appeal
procedures that often involve employee committees or peer review
panels to hear complaints and recommend resolutions.9 Again, these
types of processes, which more and more firms are implementing to
address the diverse types of conflicts that arise in workplaces today,
run afoul of the NLRA's restrictions on employee participation in
non-union settings.
A second challenge to the use of ADR and workplace self
governance procedures as alternatives to traditional regulatory
strategies is that individual workers are at a significant power
disadvantage in processing a complaint or raising a safety concern vis-
a-vis their employer. Civil rights advocates, women's groups, and
union representatives have voiced this critique with particular
passion.10 To the extent that this is a problem, the obvious solution is
for unions and/or other advocacy groups to provide representation
services to individuals and groups that have a need for this type of
representation. I believe this is a challenge and an opportunity for
labor organizations. Again, however, it will take the reforms in labor
law proposed above to open the law to this type of institutional
innovation and new type of representation.
D. Lagging Changes in Labor Markets
So far all of the changes in labor policies and regulations
8. See Mary Rowe, Options and Choice for Conflict Resolution in the Workplace, in
NEGOTIATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAINS, 105, 105-19 (Lavinia Hall ed., 1993); See
generally COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 1.
9. See Rowe, supra note 8.
10. See generally COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
supra note 1.
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suggested focus on relationships inside the firm, or between workers
and individual employers. Yet increasingly, workers' economic
security and advancement are determined by their ability to move
across jobs and employers. Wage inequality has increased
dramatically in response to increased premiums firms are placing on
education, skills with new technologies, work practices, and
behavioral attributes. Permanent job loss has increased relative to
temporary layoffs and spread to a broader range of occupations,
therefore increasing the importance of policies designed to support
mobility without large losses in earning power and income security.
This, in turn, increases the importance of life-long learning and
human capital development and maintenance.
Given these new realities, labor market policies need to be
updated to lower the costs of transitions across employers to both
individuals and firms. This implies the need to decouple provisions of
health insurance coverage from individual firms, increasing the
portability of pension benefits and other retirement savings plans,
modifying unemployment insurance coverage to cover employees
with shorter employment durations with single employers, and
allowing for continuation of benefits to employees who invest in
training or retraining when making a transition between jobs. Indeed,
it may be time for a detailed and comprehensive look at labor market
policies to ask how they might be reformed to accommodate a more
mobile and transient work force.
IV. COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
A. Full Service Unions
In a session at the 1994 Industrial Relations Research
Association devoted to honoring Jack Barbash, I argued the need
for the development of a new brand of unionism: "Full service"
unions -representative institutions that provide the full range of
services discussed above, including: individual representation and
labor market service to workers over the course of their careers,
regardless of where and for whom they work; support and training for
direct employee participation; collective bargaining; and
representation in corporate governance structures and processes.
11. See Thomas A. Kochan, Trade Unionism and Industrial Relations: Notes on Theory and
Practice for the 1990s, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, at 185-95 (1994).
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The changes in policy discussed above would both create a market
and a need for this array of services. Existing union and professional
associations, perhaps along with new employee organizations that
would likely emerge in response to this demand, would compete for
members. In this way, workers might regain control over whether or
not and by what type of organization they will be represented.
The new leadership of the AFL-CIO has instilled both a renewed
sense of mission and commitment to organizing, both in traditional
and in new ways. In addition, organizations such as Working Today 2
and the Workplace Partnership, affiliated with the San Jose,
California, Central Labor Council, are springing up and
experimenting with ways of providing labor market services and a
voice to contingent workers and others that are not organizable under
a workplace based exclusive representative collective bargaining
policy. Coalitions of community and labor organizations are at work
in various cities such as Baltimore, Boston, Milwaukee, and others
seeking to promote "living wage" campaigns. These are just
examples of what I believe will be needed to identify the mix of
different labor organizations and forms of representation and service
delivery that I believe are needed today and in the future.
B. Human Capital and the American Corporation
American corporations will need to undergo equally significant
changes if they are to do their part in renegotiating and updating their
social contracts with the American workforce. The legal rules
specifying that the goal of the American corporation is to maximize
shareholder wealth grew out of an environment in the early part of
this century when it was necessary to pool large amounts of finance
capital to build the large scale companies capable of serving the
expanding mass markets that were developing at the time. 13 Thus, the
owners of finance capital became the primary "residual risk" bearers
of the firm and the most powerful beneficiaries of the success of the
firm. If we are to re-negotiate the social contract in employment, we
may need to open up a debate over the goals of the corporation, its
governance structures and processes, and particularly over the role of
12. See Sara Horowitz, A New Labor Market Structure for a Transient and Mobile
Workforce, 1:1 PERSPECrIVES ON WORK, at 50, 50-52 (1997).
13. See generally CARL KAYSEN, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY (1996); MARK J.
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994).
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human capital as both a critical asset and a residual risk bearer. 14 In
many cases today, the human assets are the firm's most critical
resource, yet both employment and corporate laws, and the
ideologies that support them, deter employees and their
representatives from participating in corporate governance and
shaping corporate practices in ways that might achieve mutual gains
or more equitable trade-offs and distributions of rewards to all the
stakeholders who bear residual risks should the corporation fail. But
the law is neither the only, nor perhaps the most critical problem.
Managers and union leaders also need to have the vision and
leadership styles needed to implement a stakeholder model of the
firm. How we move beyond the rhetoric of the notion that employees
are critical and legitimate stakeholders in corporations to the
concrete changes in legal doctrines, ideology, and organizational
practices is a key challenge that, if left unaddressed, will continue to
limit the sustainability of many of the other policy and institutional
innovations discussed above. Thus, this issue deserves a place on the
policy agenda if we are to update the full range of institutions that
influence the nature of social contracts in employment relationships.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above discussion suggests that there is no one single new
social contract that will meet the needs of the economy and the labor
force of the future. Thus, the challenge lies in providing the parties to
employment relationships with the tools they need to re-negotiate
their relationships in ways suited to their needs. For those employees
with sufficient skills and labor market power this might be done on an
individual basis. For many, however, it will require the
modernization of labor and employment laws and institutions
outlined here.
This is a tall order, and one that presently lacks a significant
political constituency. It includes several changes favored by labor
and opposed by management, and vice-versa, and ideas that neither
interest group favors and both perceive as a threat to their interests.
But this is what I believe is needed to break the political logjam that
has been reinforced by years of failed efforts at incremental reforms
within the prevailing legal structures. Nevertheless, there is little
reason to believe significant change will be forthcoming in the short
14. See generally MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995).
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run. Instead, a more realistic hope might be that sufficient
experimentation is fostered at the grass roots level with new
approaches to addressing the issues facing employers and workers
that creates the empirical basis for policy and institutional
innovations when the pressures to do something can no longer be
avoided.
What is our role in all of this? I mentioned at the outset of this
essay that we may be in a time period similar to the one John R.
Commons and his associates encountered at the beginning of this
century. The dominant "labor problems" of that era were the poor
working conditions found in the newly emerging mass production
industries, the lack of unions or other institutions capable of
providing workers with a voice in determining and improving these
conditions, and the inadequacies of the common law doctrines as
legal principles for governing employment relationships. Commons,
his students, and his associates labored for over two decades
documenting employment practices, studying newly emerging forms
of unions and collective bargaining, and proposing new public policies
at the state level before their ideas and research findings provided the
intellectual foundation for the New Deal labor and employment laws
and administrative procedures. We are now in a similar situation.
While it is impossible to know how long it will take for the political
pressures to build to the point where it becomes necessary and
possible to enact a new set of principles and laws governing
employment relations, our generation of researchers and
professionals will be judged by the power of the ideas and evidence
we bring to bear on these debates, if and when they occur.
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